War Stories: Gaining Insight into Conflict from the Eye of the Beholder
Actors in any scenario view the unfolding events from the ‘prism of their own perspective.’ War, and its own uncertainties, renders the truth of each narrative even more challenging to discern. Amid conflict, each event exists as a discrete snapshot in time. Details are vivid to the observer but ultimately efface over time. Conflict, as viewed from its participants, cannot necessarily be examined in the way that Sir Michael Howard would have historians view it, in ‘depth, breadth, and context.’ This doesn’t discount the utility of studying events from ‘the eye of the beholder,’ but it does risk limiting both the breadth and context of the event. Depth, unlike breadth and context, is different. Depth emanates from the singular views of those who participated in the conflicts.
When several disparate experiences of the same event (or series of events) are patched together through the lens of each participant, a clearer picture of the period emerges. This is especially true when each of the accounts examines an event from a different standpoint. A method for attacking an event’s inherent complexity is to examine the conflict at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. Primary sources provide these types of vantage points well. Collections and secondhand sources also work provided they are comprehensively researched. Luckily, as the ability to generate thoughts expands through both the internet and social media, there will be more and more primary sources available for each event. Looking for similarities from each telling of a history can reveal the gestalt of the period and give the reader a sense of how those who lived the event experienced it firsthand. A quick case study of three books viewed with this lens follows and some general observations are presented at the end of the case.
Vietnam: A Case Study
War stories, almost a trope of historical novels, belie an important point about the thesis presented earlier. Each participant’s experience of war comes from his own viewpoint and often fails to present most of the context of each discrete event. In reading books that have focused on Vietnam, notably, Tank Sergeant, by Ralph Zumbro, About Face, by David H. Hackworth, and A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam, by Neil Sheehan, a deeper picture of the Vietnam experience can be ascertained. The tactical, operational, and strategic approaches described in each book respectively are illuminating. Providing an examination of these books from each ‘foxhole’ of the Vietnam War shows some similarities that help understand the entirety of the period.
Tank Sergeant (Tactical)
Ralph Zumbro was a junior enlisted armor crew member in his initial experience in Vietnam and was promoted to sergeant during his tour (1967-1968). Initially drafted in 1957 and exiting service in 1962, Sergeant Zumbro re-enlisted specifically to go to Vietnam. Assigned to the storied A Company, 1st Battalion, 69th Armor (the most decorated tank unit in the Vietnam War), his entire view of the Vietnam War was tactical. This is quite literal, for most of his time in Vietnam, Sergeant Zumbro saw the jungles of Vietnam from a viewport on an M60 Main Battle Tank. His account of authority figures within the book, especially those serving at higher than the company grade level, is laced with suspicion and doubt regarding their competence. Past this, however, there are many lessons of value for junior tankers to glean from his book, a veritable tactical textbook on the art of persistent tank warfare in support of infantry operations. Further discussions about expeditionary maintenance and ‘scrounging’ are indicative of the challenges that armored formations face to this day. Despite covering a variety of battlefield encounters and specific tactics used against the Viet Cong and their regular North Vietnamese allies, one of the best points of the book is how Zumbro proffers a view of the individual tank crew member in a wider conflict. Sergeant Zumbro found that the ethnic Montagnard’s were determined fighters, however, they were equipped poorly because mistrust from the Saigon regime. Struggles with advising and assisting the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, and further disheartening encounters with Korean allies in and around Pleiku are other tactical and partner force relationship building that are valuable insights into the milieu of the period. Taken from Sergeant Zumbro’s point of view it would appear as if most tactical scenarios in Vietnam were very successful.
About Face: The Odyssey of an American Warrior (Operational)
David H. Hackworth is a longstanding household name within the Army community. Not only were his books required reading material in the late 80s and early 90s for young Infantry officers, but his methods of training were also heralded as successful in the draftee Army of Vietnam. Famously, the ‘Flight of the Valkyries’ scene from Apocalypse Now was based on his exploits. This, in almost any examination alone, would likely make his story worth reading. His scathing rebuke of the prosecution of the Vietnam War on ‘Questions and Answers’ in 1971 was intensely critical and made major headlines at the time. His book, About Face, discusses his Army career in its entirety and how it led him to his 1971 interview. He credits hard training, notions of challenging authority, and realism in preparation for deployments to be the critical ingredients of success for any Army unit. There should hardly be any disagreement with the first and third tenets of his strategy, but it is interesting to see again the rebuke of authority figures run as a theme throughout his writings.
Of further note, the derisive nature of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and its operational outlook is an omnipresent theme during the Vietnam portion of this book. In the eyes of Colonel Hackworth, Vietnam was lost at the operational level with the assignment of advisors who lacked necessary combat experience to advise senior Vietnamese officers. Colonel Hackworth relays the story of line infantry units that were constantly undermanned, rife with morale problems and challenged to see how their participation in the war furthered any objectives. Further, in Colonel Hackworth’s view, the corrupt nature of a political assignment system in Vietnam, coupled with the rotational nature of Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) advisors, enabled ARVN commanders to prioritize personal gain over operational successes. Insistent that both MACV and ARVN officers were either deceiving or outright lying to their superiors about their operational gains on the battlefield through misleading statistics about body counts or hamlet clearances, Colonel Hackworth’s Vietnam experience through and up to the operational lens displays a view that is clearly more pessimistic than Sergeant Zumbro’s.
A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam (Strategic)
Neil Sheehan, in A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam, lays out the life and career of John Paul Vann. Neil Sheehan famously took approximately 14 years to complete this full manuscript after accepting an initial advance in 1972. This book differs from the other two in that it is not written by a primary source. Nevertheless, this Pulitzer Prize winning text is a well-researched examination of the life of John Paul Vann as well as the entirety of the Vietnam War and the major actors within. If someone could only read one book about the Vietnam War, this one likely provides perhaps the most fulsome examination of the war and its full spectrum progress. The strategic level narrative delves into the personal lives of each of the protagonists of the Vietnam war with a focus on John Paul Vann in both military and civil service. While there is focus in particular on this man’s life, the book also serves as a history of the escalation, and then ‘Vietnamization’ of the war from an American perspective.
John Paul Vann, according to Neil Sheehan, participated in Vietnam from the very start of the conflict at the operational level as an Army MACV advisor at the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. He continued his service in various civilian capacities, culminating at the strategic level as the senior American advisor to II Corps of the ARVN, defending the Northern Highlands during the 1972 Easter Offensive. From this vantage, further derision of the corrupt nature of the ARVN forces as well as political realities in both South Vietnam and the United States, can be seen to have had great effect on the outcome of the conflict. Mr. Vann saw that the best commanders were not necessarily promoted in accordance with their skill, rather allies of the president found themselves in command of vital formations. These commanders did not typically act with the best interest of the prosecution of the war effort in mind. Past these experiences, Mr. Vann had direct contact with the United States’ Ambassador to Vietnam and President Nixon’s National Security Advisor. From letters written at the time, Mr. Sheehan is able to shed light on these aforementioned political realities. Unfortunately, Mr. Vann was killed in a helicopter crash in the waning days of the Easter Offensive. Yet, Mr. Sheehan argues that his impact on the conduct of the Vietnam War was unquestionably important.
Thoughts in Conclusion
Although presented in ‘rapid-fire’ manner, each of these books delves into Vietnam War lessons from each player’s viewpoint. Counter-authority themes run through each one of these books. Strategically, it is clear that the Army of the Republic of Vietnam was viewed with disdain by each actor. Operationally, by failing to properly train, arm, and equip the Regional Forces/Popular Forces (local militias within Vietnam) and adhering to pacification protocols, the United States military lost a key enabler in the counterinsurgency campaign. Further, by enabling repression of Buddhist and other segments of the population not associated with French Colonial rule, the Saigon government was doomed to fail. From a more tactical level, it appears that understrength unit manning and personnel replacement processes (units were deployed individually versus as a cohesive organization) were problematic to mission accomplishment. Viewed even further, as the first war fought with the ability to analyze metrics, the ‘body count’ emerged as perhaps one of the worst indicators of battlefield success or failure, especially when counted against a guerrilla enemy.
Through viewing the Vietnam War through three different viewpoints, a picture of similarities becomes clear. As information is more readily available from more primary sources, it facilitates an examination of the ‘breadth, depth, and context’ of a conflict. Some deep research can yield primary documents from a variety of time periods. When looking through individual lenses, there are likely some events that are left out or downplayed in stories. However, an analysis can be performed to identify these shortcomings. Hopefully, this method of individual-collective analysis provides readers a useful insight into any conflict of which they seek to gain a further ‘depth’ of understanding.
Alexander Boroff is an active duty Army Major serving as an Army Joint Chiefs of Staff Intern on the Army Staff in the G-3-5-7.
Opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not represent those of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or any part of the U.S. government.