New (and Old) Considerations for Armored Conflict: Lessons from 2010 Onward
If you were to take a smattering of tactical military articles from 2014 onwards, you would likely be uninspired to join the tanker ranks of the United States Army. Be it the Marine Corps’ divestment of tanks, or perhaps more alarmingly, the recent conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, tanks seem like a bad investment. Some think the large-scale use of tanks, as seen in Cold War-era defense plans for the Fulda Gap and in the tank on tank battles fought during the first Gulf War, might be a thing of the past. But the need for protected, mobile, and high firepower support systems for combat soldiers will endure. The Mobile Protected Firepower system and the up-gunned Stryker variant that the United States Army is acquiring are testaments to such a requirement. The Army places such a high importance on this capability that it continues research and experimentation of optionally manned vehicle fighting systems and robots, while simultaneously testing how best to incorporate firepower and maneuverability into infantry formations.
But if unmanned armor platforms are the way of the future, where does that leave the soldier who has specialized in the maneuver, sustainment, and tactical employment of tanks on the battlefield? Is this leader destined to command tanks remotely, rather than from the hatch? In almost any case, the answer is likely no, at least not in the near term. But what tactical lessons can be gleaned from the modern employment of armor in warfare? A few immediately stick out, and they pose questions that up-and-coming armor leaders should consider.
1. Tactically Train Against Current Enemy Techniques to Yield Operational Success
Anyone viewing the vast amount of drone footage from the recent conflicts in Syria and Azerbaijan can see the clusters of vehicles exposed to one way or precision drone attack. Obviously, these units ‘fought as they trained:’ according to doctrine that emphasized specific movement formations and techniques. Overhead cover for vehicles appears to be non-existent, and Armenian tanks appear almost static throughout the footage released by official Azeri media. No thought appears to have been given to loitering munitions, with the deadly results played out on the battlefield. In his ongoing review of the War in the Donbass, MAJ Amos Fox highlights issues that the Ukrainians faced in mass exposure of their armored formations due to lack of dispersal. High attrition of Ukrainian armor in the opening portions of the conflict seems to confirm these failed tactics initially used by the Ukrainian armed forces. Even still, the current employment of armor by the Ukrainian separatists appears to be hindering the Ukrainian Government’s progress towards stability, showing how critical the loss of armored capability was to plans to reclaim seperatist territory. The failure to train as you expect to fight (based on the enemy’s own tactics and the terrain you expect to fight in!) led to operational failures. Clustering is a natural tendency that all leaders must fight against. What is the prospective leader’s plan to mitigate the desire for face-to-face communication with their subordinates? How can you best build a common operational picture when you are fighting in a dispersed manner?
2. Electronic Signature is as Important as Physical Signature
Although this is somewhat a redundant point, radio transmissions or overall electronic signature must be considered at all times as well. Although invisible to our eye, electronic signatures are more and more a concern of a tactical leader. While crucial for command posts, it should be of concern at the small unit level as well. In the opening days of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh the Azeris employed diversionary drones in order to expose the anti-air defenses of the Armenians. Once exposed, the Azeris targeted these defenses with further one way attack unmanned aerial vehicles. Countermeasures work to an extent, but until they are ubiquitous on the battlefield, leaders need to consider the electromagnetic spectrum as part of their attack or defensive planning. How often is the company level leader consulting the battalion intelligence office about enemy electronic collection capabilities? Can the leader see his or her electronic signature? What does this mean for a leader sending multiple radio transmissions across a spectrum of different devices? How mobile is his or her command post? Are leaders truly able to limit communications to the bare minimum while maintaining the common operational picture?
3. Terrain (as usual) Still Matters
Perhaps this isn’t a surprise, but in each of the recent conflicts involving armored warfare, (Ukraine, Syria, and Nagorno-Karabakh), terrain remains a critical factor in the employment and utility of tanks on the battlefield. While the mountainous terrain of the Caucuses proved deadly to both sides of the Armenian-Azeri conflict, the semi-urban and urban terrain in Syria proved wholly different to the utilization of armor. In this case, physical obstacles encountered by pro-government forces proved to be one of the bigger causes for the employment of armor. Most contemporary articles circulating about the use of the T-72 and T-90 in Syria point to poor training as a root cause of the issues with their successful employment. Mass drone strikes in Syria, (in a deadly preview of what was to come with the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict) also accounted for attrition in the Syrian armored forces. The tactical leader must always take into account terrain when planning for the employment of armor.
4. Sustainment Above All
All of the tactical questions above have a key piece missing from them. Explaining this best is perhaps an important quote about armored warfare (that wasn’t made in reference to armored warfare) suffices, “My logisticians are a humorless lot … they know if my campaign fails, they are the first ones I will slay.” Alexander the Great allegedly portrayed the need of integrated logistics and maneuver insightfully around 300 BC, and it still rings true today. Armor officers, whether placed in reconnaissance roles or into a more direct tank fight, must be masters of this warfighting function in order to successfully execute their craft. The logistical tail associated with mechanized warfare is enormous, and should be considered as critical for the success of combined armed maneuver warfare. In great power warfare, the side that can replace its losses, maintain its equipment, and fuel its army is usually the winner. No matter the type of vehicle, nor domain of conflict, logistical concerns will always play a factor into conflict. What is an armor leader doing to make sure that his or her higher headquarters is aware of his or her sustainment needs? Considering all of the factors above, how will the armor leader sustain his or her forces? What must be done differently to account for all the new battlefield threats?
Parting Thoughts
Although perhaps the traditional tank on tank engagement may be a thing of the past, the skills that it takes to employ armor are still critical. As we move forward to the point where set piece tank battles may no longer be a facet of modern warfare, some of its key tenets remain both trainable and important. Movement formations and lethality based on crew coherency are very important, yet an armor leader must now consider camouflage, electronic deception, and mission command practices and systems to enable their success more readily in this new environment. Further, enemy tactics must be studied and actively planned against in order to ensure future mission success. The question that seems pervasive in each lesson can likely be summarized as; “What is the best way to build a common operational picture and execute mission command over maneuver forces, all the while sustaining them, given the constraints placed on the modern leader?”
What is the best way to build a common operational picture and execute mission command over maneuver forces, all the while sustaining them, given the constraints placed on the modern leader?
Alexander Boroff is an active duty Army Major serving as an Army Joint Chiefs of Staff Intern on the Army Staff in the G-3-5-7. An Armor Officer, MAJ Boroff has commanded company formations in both the generating and operational force.