Command and the Game of Telephone
Everyone remembers the game of telephone from grade school. If not, here is a refresher. Children sit in a circle and start with an individual message. This message is passed from child to child. There are a few rules that make this a challenging game. Usually, each child is only allowed to say the message once as they pass it along, and he or she must convey the message by whispering into the child’s ear next to him or her. Inevitably, this game of ‘telephone’ leads to the messaging being completely garbled or perhaps not even recognizable as the original message.
Inevitably, this game of ‘telephone’ leads to the messaging being completely garbled or perhaps not even recognizable as the original message.
Command, at times, works in a similar way. Let’s consider this example: As a dismounted reconnaissance commander, I was concerned about the rate at which my soldiers consumed water. My soldiers would have to carry what they use to stay hydrated, and the weight of water is a limiting factor in and of itself. Given the likely mission set of deep dismounted reconnaissance insertions, every resupply that our troop needed to conduct would be a risky operation. Not only could these resupply missions reveal the soldiers and their observation post positions to the enemy, they also put those conducting the missions in jeopardy. As such, when my platoons went to the field for training exercises, I told the platoon leadership that I wanted to know how much water the soldiers consumed on average. Everything seemed to be moving as planned, and I received the estimated water consumption rate for both stationary and mobile operations—or so I thought. Fast forward a few weeks, as I was conducting an inventory, I overheard soldiers discussing how ‘the commander doesn’t want them to drink water.’ Obviously this was never my intent, but, it was clear that I failed to communicate properly to my subordinate leadership. I rectified this the next time I was able to engage the troop. But, as any media-savvy person knows, the correction never is amplified as much as the initially misreported information.
Regardless of the message that a company commander is trying to convey, a critical truth to understand is that this same experience will likely happen to you as well. When communicating a message, Simon Sinek gives some great advice in Start with Why. Perhaps if I had been clearer in communicating the water consumption request to my platoon leadership, they could have passed this intent down the chain of command. This, again, was no failure on my subordinate leaders, but rather, on myself. In failing to account for how my message may be interpreted, I failed to realize how my message may have been heeded by those without context for it. Sometimes this is flushed out in the orders process with the Commander’s Intent. Unfortunately, commanders don’t always have the luxury of publishing an entire order for every detail of every task.
In failing to account for how my message may be interpreted, I failed to realize how my message may have been heeded by those without context for it.
A further dilemma that awaits the aspiring commander is the unfortunate nature of the spoken word. Nearly everything that the commander says will be taken at face value with relatively little context allowed for. This can be seen in another example of a failure during my command, caused by a few of my spoken words when questioned about the purpose of why the troop was conducting a safety task to standard while other troops were visibly not, or at least ‘visibly enough’, resulting in the soldiers in my troop thinking we ‘were the only ones doing the task.’ This safety task, of course, was the continuous wear of the Advanced Combat Helmet. My response to ‘why are we wearing our helmets if all the other troops are not’ was ‘because we (meant collective we) are being evaluated at all times.’ Those who were within earshot quickly translated this into ‘Captain Boroff is being evaluated so he wants to make sure he follows every rule.’ In my view, given that we were from a separate brigade, participating in a brigade validation exercise with another brigade, we were under a microscope. Unfortunately, again, words were taken as they were said. It is impossible to provide context for every conceivable situation to all bystanders, but the knowledge of how your words will be interpreted are important to understand.
There are a few methods in the prospective commander’s toolkit to combat this misinterpretation of their message. Formations, or at least complete company gatherings, allow a commander to directly communicate with his or her subordinates. That way, soldiers can hear the message ‘from the horse’s mouth’. In this way, the commander is in complete control of the message. While this can be a good tactic, it cannot be overused, formations are a drain on time and energy, and put unnecessary strain on the overall company. Confirmation briefs from subordinates, when prudent, are also incredibly helpful. As a commander, to hear what your subordinate interpreted form your order is usually very illuminating. Not only are you able to understand exactly what your subordinate ‘heard you say’, but also, you can improve your own message for the next time, or even tailor your message to particular subordinates as you improve your relationship with them.
Aside from these aspects of language and communication, your messaging as a commander starts and ends with you. Once you have let slip the words or orders, they are no longer yours.
Having been counselled on ‘speaking without thinking’ more than once, and upon further reflection, it is this author’s opinion that less is more when it comes to spoken discussion. Aside from these aspects of language and communication, your messaging as a commander starts and ends with you. Once you have let slip the words or orders, they are no longer yours. If you have not been clear and concise with your language and intent, you, as I did on more than one occasion, will end up playing a long game of telephone with your soldiers, and be left in the unenviable position of attempting to clean up your errors.
Alexander Boroff is an active duty Army Captain serving as an Army Joint Chiefs of Staff Intern in the Chairman’s Public Affairs Office. An Armor Officer, CPT Boroff has commanded company formations in both the generating and operational force.