Operational Art: The More Things Change, The More They Stay the Same

Bret Wilbanks

20 Aug, 2023

Operational Art: The More Things Change, The More They Stay the Same

By Bret Wilbanks

With the introduction of Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, the Army introduced its latest theory of warfare, Multi-domain Operations (MDO). This has led the Army and the professional community to question if there will be a change in the way planners approach operational art. While the basic theory of operational art, according to Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, is “the cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and mean,” will remain the same, the changing character of war will result in the expanded scope of operational art in all domains through the range of military operations.1 Examining history, theory, and doctrine, the existing theory of operational art will continue to provide the framework that organizes tactical actions to meet strategic ends. But its application will evolve to incorporate advances in technology and world affairs.

A Brief History of Operational Art

There are many conflicting opinions on who introduced operational art to warfare, ranging from Napoleon to Ulysses S. Grant and Alexandr Svechin in the Soviet Union. While the debate about its appearance in warfare continues, the U.S. Army finds many of its theories on operational art in the writings of Carl von Clausewitz’s work On War. Clausewitz observed that “The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose.”2 These statements lay the basis for operational art theory regardless of time. Clausewitz explains that the use of engagements is to accomplish the objective of the war. Through the examination of On War, the basic idea of operational art and Clausewitz’s “use of engagements” remain crucial to the application of operational art today. While the world has changed, the use of military force will be crafted and bound by the political objective of war.  

Another historical example reinforcing the general theory of operational art comes from Soviet General Alexandr Svechin. Svechin proposes that operational art allows the military to obtain the goal of the war. He writes, “The path to the ultimate goal is broken down into a series of operations separated by more or less lengthy pauses, which take place in different areas in a theater and differ significantly from one another.”3 Svechin’s writings reinforce the arrangement of different but overall connected operations planned to attack the enemy’s overall system and achieve the strategic goal. Svechin’s ideas would soon develop into the “Deep Battle” concept, an evolution in how operational art was utilized but not in its overall purpose. 

In the application of U.S. operational art, the arrangement of coalition forces provided a stunning victory in Operation Desert Storm. Understanding the political objective of ejecting Iraqi forces from Kuwait and protecting Saudi Arabia allowed U.S. military planners to sequence operations to achieve this end state. While often stated as the anomaly for U.S. wars, the development of a complex plan that included an air and ground phase showed that the operational planners understood their doctrine and the capabilities of the joint force. The plan  further employed the capabilities in such a way that resulted in the political objective’s accomplishment in a relatively short period. In examining the planning and execution of the operation, some of the wrong conclusions were taken away, such as that future wars could be won by smart weapons alone. Observing these historical examples, the application of operational art has evolved. However, its theory only warrants the application of new tools.   

A New Theory?

The theory of operational art remains largely unchanged but merely adapts to technology and the world’s political environment. While significant doctrinal additions such as design and systems thinking (DST) have added to the process of conducting operational art, the overall U.S. theory of arranging tactical actions to achieve strategic ends has remained the same. Bringing operational art into the 21st century and preparing for the next war does not require a radical change, but we need to  educate more Soldiers in the theory of operational art. Additionally, planners applying operational art must be cognizant that what worked in a past campaign cannot be exclusively applied to the future as every war, its purpose, participants, and environment are different. 

The U.S. military’s current theory of operational art stresses the integration of end, ways, and means. Because of this, the current theory allows for changes at the doctrinal level to compensate for changes in technology and world affairs. Although the practice of operational art adapts  to meet the evolution of warfare and the world, operational art should be viewed as a continuous refinement of techniques and methods to achieve the strategic objective through military means. Changes in the theory of operational art are less necessary than education on the application of the subject. To apply operational art effectively, the military must create more politically astute officers capable of understanding and shaping operations to meet the strategic goal.  

Additionally, to further exploit the use of operational art in the 21st century, more emphasis should be placed on DST. While DST is essential to the operational artist’s creative and critical thinking process, understanding and using these planning tools will only become more important in the future. The changing nature of warfare will require operational artists to consider the multitude of actors, systems, and subsystems that will make up future wars. With the capabilities that exist and that will be developed in space and cyberspace, operational artists of the future will contend with a multitude of complex problems that require critical thinking and outside knowledge to achieve the nation’s strategic goals.

New Doctrine

With the introduction of MDO, the Army has embraced the cyberspace and space domains as an essential part of future warfare and key to accomplishing its missions. This doctrinal development explains how the Army sees itself fighting and winning in a future conflict. While the concept of operational art is not new, the addition of these two domains represents an evolution to which the current application of operational art must adapt. To integrate and understand the additional domains, the theory and application of operational art must give greater weight to the element of tempo within the cyber and space domains while also integrating further not only with the joint force but other interagency partners to bring all assets and instruments of national power to bear. 

The continued fielding of unmanned systems, along with advances and, inevitably, the future fielding of AI systems on the battlefield, will result in a faster tempo for military operations. Tempo will also increase with the proliferation of the cyber -and space domains. The tempo of 21st-century operations will require faster decision-making and reaction time with the ability to conceptualize and plan for multiple branch and sequel plans to react to enemy action or reaction to operations. Tempo will also affect the control of friendly and enemy narratives and the overall information space. Through the further incorporation of the space and cyber domains with operational art, the future military planner can plan for, respond to, and influence the information space. The use of new technologies and the ability to shape messaging and perceptions using traditional messaging, social media, and the internet will be vital in shaping the success of an operation. 

While the MDO concept drives the operational artist to consider the additions of space and cyberspace, risk is another tenant of doctrine that deserves consideration. Risk will only increase as technology evolves and the stakes become higher for using military force, either lethal or non-lethal. The future application of operational art will place more weight on the non-lethal effects that will be applied and must consider the risk of an enemy counteraction. Risk must also be considered in employing lower echelons as battlespace owners and their effects on the strategic environment. On the dispersed battlefield, smaller elements and lower echelons will use operational art conceivably. Although the Army has again designated the division as the unit of action, it must consider the design and operational art of the Global War on Terrorism. While the Army’s focus on large-scale combat operations is the current paradigm for the perceived conflicts of the future, small forces will still own battle space , and commanders at lower echelons must still be empowered to use tactical actions to accomplish the strategic objective. Further considerations when applying operational art will contend with the risk of hybrid warfare both on the battlefield and through nonlethal effects in space and cyberspace by adversaries and arranging actions in time and space to counter these threats.   

Analysis

The Army’s theory of operational art, “the pursuit of strategic objectives, in whole or in part, through the arrangement of tactical actions in time, space, and purpose,” remains sound entering the 21st century. Examining the evolution of operational art, the capabilities and the character of war change, but the use of tactical actions that seek to achieve a strategic goal remains the same. While the theory itself does not require change, the tools and operational considerations for planners will undoubtedly evolve with the introduction of new technologies and the ever-changing political landscape. Operational art will continue to be used to shape future warfare. It must inherently become more joint and inclusive of interagency partners and capabilities. With the inclusion of the space and cyberspace domains into doctrine and acknowledging their inclusion in future warfare, the elements of operational art and the principles of war will continue to serve as a guide to crafting future military operations. 

About the Author:

Bret Wilbanks is an active-duty Army Major serving as a planner in the 3rd Infantry Division. As an Armor Officer, he has served as a Scout Platoon Leader in the 5th Squadron, 73rd Cavalry Regiment, Fort Liberty (then Bragg), NC and as a Tank Company and Headquarters Troop Commander in the 4th Squadron 10th U.S. Cavalry Regiment, Fort Carson, CO. His interests include military history, grilling, old guitars, and spending time with his wife, daughter, and two dogs.

Opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not represent those of the United States Army, the Department of Defense, or the United States Government.

Endnotes:

  1. US Department of Defense, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2017), xxi.
  2. Carl von Clausewitz et al., On War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989). 88.
  3. A. Svechin and Kent D. Lee, Strategy (East View Publications, 1992). 68-69.

Bibliography:

  1. Clausewitz, Carl von, Michael Howard, Peter Paret, and Bernard Brodie. On War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989. 
  2. Svechin, A., and Kent D. Lee. Strategy. East View Publications, 1992. 
  3. US Department of Defense. Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2017.
  4. US Department of the Army, Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 3-0, Operations. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2019.